Georgia Law Review
Volume 52

Number 3

Article 8

2018

Talk Isn't Cheap: Protecting Freedom of Speech in Light of
Georgia's Anti-Boycott Legislation
Maria Kachniarz
University of Georgia School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr
Part of the First Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Kachniarz, Maria (2018) "Talk Isn't Cheap: Protecting Freedom of Speech in Light of Georgia's Anti-Boycott
Legislation," Georgia Law Review: Vol. 52: No. 3, Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss3/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of
Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more information, please
contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Kachniarz: Talk Isn't Cheap: Protecting Freedom of Speech in Light of Georgi

TALK ISN'T CHEAP: PROTECTING
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN LIGHT OF
GEORGIA'S ANTI-BOYCOTT LEGISLATION
Maria Kachniarz
Historically,political boycotts have occupied a central
place in American tradition, going as far back as the
Founding. However, the years of 2016 and 2017 have
marked a sudden influx of state anti-boycott legislation.
Georgia was no exception, passing a statute in 2016
prohibiting those who boycott Israel from contracting
with the state. This statue violates the FirstAmendment
guaranteesof freedom of speech. First, boycotts of Israel,
or BDS as they are collectively called, are protected
political speech. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
protected politically motivated boycotts, despite their
detrimental economic effects. Further, Georgia's antiboycott legislation impermissibly stifles that protected
speech by conditioning government contracts on the
relinquishment of constitutional rights. The Supreme
Court has struck down such legislation-even if the
beneficiary has no right to the benefit-as
unconstitutional. Lastly, the Georgia does not have a
defense of government speech, as contracts have not been
historically used to convey a government message. The
freedom to engage in political speech through boycotts
lays at the center of First Amendment rights, and the
Supreme Court will likely strike down Georgia'sstatute
as unconstitutional.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Political boycotts have been an integral part of United States
history since colonial times.1 In fact, our "nation was born out of a
series of colonial boycotts against British merchants." 2 In 1767,
merchants in nearly all of the colonies banded together and refused
to buy British goods as a way to pressure the British Parliament
into addressing their grievances. 3 The story of political boycotts did
not stop there. Even as the states were ratifying the United States
Constitution, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay boycotted
merchants who engaged in slave labor. 4 Since then, communities
have repeatedly used political boycotts as a tool of social change.
Although U.S. courts have not always protected boycotts, the
cannot be
of this unfolding jurisprudence
significance
underestimated. The evolution and history of American courts'
treatment of political boycotts ultimately changed the landscape of
5
First Amendment jurisprudence.
Because political boycotts may have a detrimental economic
effect on those boycotted businesses, they can quickly create
enemies. 6 Targets are greatly incentivized to swiftly challenge and
enjoin boycotts. One such reaction is exemplified in legislation that
Georgia passed last year. The statute conditions government
contracts on parties abstaining from participation in boycotts
against Israel. This Note will examine the legality of Georgia's antiboycott legislation through the lens of constitutional jurisprudence,
and argue that the statute unconstitutionally conditions
I

See MARTYN BENNETT, ENGLISH CIVIL WAR: A HISTORICAL COMPANION 97 (Scarecrow

Press 2d ed. 2009) (describing how early colonial merchants refused to pay taxes as a form of
protest against the English government).
2 Theresa J. Lee, Democratizingthe Economic Sphere: A Case for the PoliticalBoycott, 115
W. VA. L. REV. 531, 538 (2012) (quoting Transcript of Petitioner's Oral Argument at 5, NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (No. 81-202)).
3 Colonists Respond to Townshend Acts with Boycott - 1767, HIST. CENT., http://www.
historycentral.com/Revolt/Boycott.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (noting that, except for
New Hampshire, merchants from all of the colonies agreed to not import British goods as a
way to protest the Townshend Act).
4 Id. (describing Alexander Hamilton and John Jay boycotting merchants who engaged in
slave trade) (citation omitted).
5 See, e.g., Missouri v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (1980) (staging a political
boycott to pressure states into ratifying the Equal Rights Amendment); NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (leading a boycott against white merchants to pressure
politicians to comply with desegregation).
6 See, e.g., Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (describing an attempt by target
businesses at stopping a boycott).
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government contracts on the relinquishment of First Amendment
rights.
Boycotts of Israel have collectively come to be known as Boycott,
Divestment, Sanctions (BDS). BDS is a global movement aimed at
placing non-violent pressure on Israel to comply with international
Specifically, it calls on Israel (1) to "[e]nd[] its
law. 7
occupation... of all Arab lands and [to] dismantl[e] the
[Separation] Wall"; (2) to "[r]ecogniz[e] the fundamental rights of
the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality"; and to
"[r]espect[], protect[], and promot[e] the rights of Palestinian
refugees to return to their homes ... as stipulated in [United
Nations] Resolution 194."8 To accomplish its goals, BDS encourages
withdrawal of support for Israeli companies that are complicit in
human rights violations. 9 Over one hundred and seventy civilsociety organizations endorse BDS, 10 which has recently gained
more traction internationally and within the United States.1 1
Support for BDS comes from individuals, businesses, "boards,
unions, universities, and pension funds, many of them in the United
States. ' 12 Just last year, seven of the ten University of California
campuses demanded that the Board of Regents "divest from
13
American companies . . . profiting from the [Israeli] occupation."
Even religious institutions are among those who support BDS. In
one instance, "[t]he pension board of the United Methodist Church
announced [early January of 2016] that it has blacklisted Israel's
five major banks."1 4 Several other national associations, like the

7 See What Is BDS?, BDS: FREEDOM JUSTICE EQUALITY, https:/fbdsmovement.net/whatis-bds (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (giving an overview of BDS and explaining its three main
goals).
8

Id.

9 Id. (describing the official stance of BDS as a politically motivated movement aimed at
changing policy).
10 Bernard Avishai, The E. U. Vs. B.D.S.: The Politics of Israel Sanctions, NEW YORKER
(Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-e-u-vsb-d-s-the-politics-ofisrael-sanctions (listing institutions that support BDS).
11 See BDS in the U.S.: Boycott Israel Movement Gains Support, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 29,
2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/02/bds-boycott-israel-movement-gain
s-support-160228123009723.html (noting that Orange, a major telecom corporation,
"announced its plans to withdraw from Israel"); Avishai, supra note 10 ("State Department
spokesman John Kirby unexpectedly reinforced the E.U. position, saying that 'construction,
planning, and retroactive legalization of settlements' is illegitimate .....
12 Avishai, supra note 10.
13 Id.
14 Id.
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American Anthropological Association, the American Studies
Association, and the National Women's Studies Association, have
pushed for BDS activism in the educational arena by voting to
Some major international
boycott Israeli universities. 15
the
movement by withdrawing
corporations have also supported
16
market.
Israeli
from the
Despite gaining traction, BDS still has a limited practical effect
on the Israeli economy. Although some reports attribute the
decrease in Israel's economic activity to BDS, this change is likely
due to Palestinians boycotting directly in Israel.1 7 Because BDS's
actual economic impact is insignificant, a likely motive for passing
anti-BDS laws is to "announc[e] ... disdain for a... political
movement whose goals [the government] strenuously oppose[s]."'1
Such a chilling motive "could not be more antithetical to the core
values of the First Amendment." 19
In 2016, Georgia passed a law prohibiting the state from-,
20
contracting with businesses and individuals that boycott Israel.
On March 22, 2016, "the Georgia House of Representatives passed
the measure," and on March 24, the State Senate passed the bill in
a 41-8 vote. 21 Although the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on
the constitutionality of anti-BDS legislation, this Note will reach
15 Id. (listing organizations).
16 See id. (noting that the French utility provider Veolia, the French telecom corporation

Orange, and the Irish construction company CRH have all withdrawn from the Israeli
market).
17 See Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, THE WORLD BANK, 5
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en118611468189870664/pdf./99
646-v2-REVISED-9-29-2015-PUBLIC-Box393209B-AHLC-Report-September-2015-final.pdf
("The drop in imports from Israel is the result of reduced economic activity, but also a growing
trend among Palestinian consumers to substitute products imported from Israel by those
from other countries, as a result of which non-Israeli imports were up 22 percent."); Team,
Foreign Investment in Israel Drops by 50%, NEWSWEEK (June 25, 2015), http://
(indicating that
europe.newsweek.com/foreign-investment-israel-slashed-by-half-329269
investment into Israel decreased by 46% in 2014, due in part to economic boycotts).
18 Recent Legislation: First Amendment-Political Boycotts-South CarolinaDisqualifies
Companies SupportingBDS From Receiving State Contracts. S.C. Code Ann. § 11-35-5300,
129 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2038 (2015) [hereinafter Recent Legislation].
19 Id.
20 See

O.C.G.A. § 50-5-85 (2017) (prohibiting the state from entering into certain contracts
"with an individual or company ... unless the contract includes a written certification that
such individual contract to engage in, a boycott of Israel").
21 Georgia Becomes 6th State to Pass Anti-BDS Legislation,JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY
(Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.jta.org/2016/03/28/news-opinion/politics/georgia-becom es-6thstate-to-pass-anti-bds-legislation (noting that on March 24, 2016 the State Senate approved
the bill "targeting the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement against Israel").
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two conclusions that suggest the Supreme Court would strike down
Georgia's anti-boycott legislation. First, BDS is protected political
speech under the First Amendment, and second, Georgia's anti-BDS
legislation infringes on this constitutionally protected right.
This Note will analyze the scope of BDS's First Amendment
protections and discuss why Georgia's law impinges upon these
constitutional protections. Part II of this Note will examine
Georgia's anti-boycott statute in more detail, and discuss the history
and federal jurisprudence of political boycotts. Part III will show
that BDS is alike in fundamental respects to the boycotts that have
been traditionally protected under the First Amendment and will
discuss why Georgia's statute is unconstitutional. Lastly, Part IV
will conclude by explaining why the United States Supreme Court
would likely strike down Georgia's statute.
II.BACKGROUND
A. GEORGIA'S ANTI-BOYCOTT STATUTE

Georgia's statute indicates that "[t]he state shall not enter into a
contract
with an individual or company ...unless the
contract... certifi[es] that such individual or company is not
currently engaged in, and agrees for the duration of the contract not
to engage in, a boycott of Israel."22 The statute's broad definition of
"company," encompasses virtually all types of businesses.2 3 Such a
sweeping prohibition is even more restrictive than other states'
anti-boycott legislation: Georgia's restrictions not only apply to both
businesses and individuals, but also define "boycott of Israel" in a

22 O.C.G.A. § 50-5-85(a) (2017) (defining "Boycott of Israel" as "engaging in refusals to deal
with, terminating business activities with, or other actions that are intended to limit
commercial relations with Israel or individuals or companies doing business in Israel or in
Israeli-controlled territories, when such actions are taken. . . [iln compliance.., to calls for
a boycott of Israel other than those boycotts to which 50 U.S.C. App. Section
2407(c) ...applies; or... [i]n a manner that discriminates on the basis of nationality,
national origin, religion, or other unreasonable basis that is not founded on a valid business
reason").
23 See id. (defining "company" to mean "any sole proprietorship, organization, association,
corporation, partnership, joint venture, limited partnership, limited liability partnership,
limited liability company, or other entity or business association, including all wholly owned
subsidiaries, majority owned subsidiaries, parent companies, or affiliates of such entities or
business associations, that exists for the purpose of making profit").
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broader manner than other, similar statutes. 24 Georgia's antiboycott statute prohibits a wide array of conduct and applies that
prohibition to an overwhelmingly large class of citizens.
Additionally, Georgia's legislation is particularly restrictive on
speech as compared to other states' anti-boycott legislation, because
it is content specific. While other anti-boycott legislation, such as
South Carolina's, bans state contracts with entities that are
boycotting a jurisdiction with which South Carolina practices open
trade, Georgia's statute, on the other hand, disqualifies only those
expressing political views against Israel. 25 By conditioning state
contracts on a relinquishment of protected speech, Georgia is
engaging in unconstitutional censorship.
B. POLITICAL BOYCOTTS IN U.S. HISTORY

Political boycotts have been used throughout United States
history to advance social change, equality, and change American
jurisprudence: by the black community, by women, gay rights
activists, and even Congress. In fact, the Montgomery bus boycott,
which lasted from 1955 until 1956, ultimately pressured the
Supreme Court to order the desegregation of buses. 26 A decade
later, a black community's boycott of white merchants in Mississippi
brought about the Supreme Court's recognition of political speech
as a First Amendment protection. 27 Some years later, a black
community in Arkansas also "use[d] ...economic pressure" to
"secure the attention of the 'white establishment' seen as
responsible for many acts of discrimination toward ... black
residents ...."28
24 See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. ORDER No. 157 (2016) (prohibiting the state of New York from doing
business only with those officially engaged in the BDS movement, and only pertaining to
businesses or institutions).
25 See, e.g., Recent Legislation, supra note 18, at 2030 (indicating that "[a] public entity

may not enter into a contract with a business . . . boycott[ing] ... an entity based in ... a

jurisdiction with whom South Carolina can enjoy open trade").
26 See Montgomery Bus Boycott, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/mo
ntgomery-bus-boycott (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (describing the Montgomery Bus Boycott);
see also Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (holding that segregating the bus
system is unconstitutional).
27 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 914 (1982) (holding that "[t]he right
of the States to regulate economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition against a
nonviolent, politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic change
and to effectuatd rights guaranteed by the Constitution").
28 Lee, supra note 2, at 540.
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Other groups, like suffragists at the turn of the twentieth
29
century, used political boycotts as a tool to further women's rights.
The National Organization of Women led boycotts against states
that had not passed the Equal Rights Amendment, a proposed
amendment to the Constitition that would ensure equal rights for
women. 30 The Eighth Circuit upheld this boycott as constitutionally
protected speech, despite its impact on commerce. 31 Similarly, gay
rights groups led boycotts to pressure companies into discarding
discriminatory policies. 32 Boycotts in areas other than civil rights
were also prevalent. For example, the Catholic Church in the 1930s
spread a pamphlet to over one third of Catholics in America, urging
them to abstain from watching certain identified movies. 33 This
boycott had a lasting impact on the regulation of motion pictures in
the United States. To this day, the motion picture association
continues to be subject to the oversight of an independent review
board for content of violence, sex, and profanity, all stemming from
that boycott. 34
However, a most telling illustration of the
importance and legitimacy of political boycotts came from the
federal government itself.
In 1986, Congress passed a law
boycotting South Africa in an effort to pressure the apartheid
government into dissolution. 35
29 E. Lee Elzroth, Woman Suffrage, NEW GEORGIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (Aug. 1, 2016), http://
www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/woman-suffrage
("In 1909 the
woman suffrage-connected strike of 20,000 women garment workers and a boycott by the
wealthy women who purchased clothing was coordinated by the Women's Trade Union
League in New York City.").
30 See Lee, supra note 2, at 541 ("The National Organization of Women... deployed
boycotts as a means of petitioning state governments in order to try to secure passage of the
Equal Rights Amendment ....); see also The Equal Rights Amendment, UnfinishedBusiness
for the Constitution, http://www.equalrightsamendment.org/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2017)
(noting that in 1982 the Equal Rights Amendment was ratified by thirty-five states, but
"three states short of the 38 required to put it into the Constitution").
31 See Missouri v. Nat'l Org. of Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1302 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding
that NOW's boycott was politically motivated and therefore protected).
32 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 2, at 542 (describing that after voters in Colorado voted to
repeal anti-discriminatory legislation, a boycott was called to discourage travel to Colorado
and "encourage customers not to purchase goods from Colorado"); id. (describing the boycott
of Chick-Fil-A after its president announced his opposition to same-sex marriage).
33 See id.at 543 (describing the Catholic Church's boycott).
34 Id. ("[The] external pressure [of the boycott] proved to be more successful than even
government regulation with the motion picture association continuing, even today, to be
regulated by an independent oversight body that assesses the content of movies in terms of
violence, sex, and profanity.").
35 See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, P.L. 99-440 (repealed 1993) (prohibiting
"loans to, other investments in, and certain other activities with respect to, South Africa, and
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The Supreme Court recognizes the importance of political
boycotts. The Court has repeatedly noted that "speech on public
issues occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First
36 Most
Amendment values,' and is entitled to special protection."
importantly, First Amendment constitutional protections do not
turn upon the government's approval of the speech. Rather, they
37
protect all speech regardless of its political leanings.
C. FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE

Political boycotts have not only been present historically, but
have also come to be recognized by the Supreme Court as one of the
most protected forms of speech under the First Amendment. 38 The
first big wave of litigation occurred in the Fifth Circuit during the
rise of the civil rights movement in the 1960s. 39 The court refused
to enjoin a boycott aimed at white merchants. It held that an order
prohibiting protesters from persuading others to join the boycott
was unconstitutional. 40 Soon after, the Fifth Circuit decided yet
another boycott case. 4 1 That case, Henry v. First National Bank,
laid out the First Amendment landscape, which the Supreme Court
later used when it decided its first political boycott case in 1982.
There the Circuit Court found that a state court's injunction of a
boycott, which discouraged others from doing business with white
merchants, was a "sweeping prohibition on speech and

for other purposes"); Dellums v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 863 F.2d 968, 970 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (noting that the United States imposed a series of economic sanctions against
South Africa to pressure the government to negotiate).
36 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 ("[S]peech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.").
97 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official ... can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion .... ).
38 See Lee, supra note 2, at 544 ("[T]he federal courts have recognized and protected
political consumer boycotts since the ascension of these cases in the 1950s.").
39 See Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that a boycott
protesting white establishments, in order "[t]o eliminate segregation and discrimination" is
constitutionally protected").
40 See id. at 291 (holding that "the state court injunction ... is unconstitutionally
overbroad in that it lumps the protected with the unprotected in such a way as to abridge
important public interests in the full dissemination of public expression on public issues").
41 See generally Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding a
political boycott as constitutional, where a black community withdrew patronage from white
merchants).
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communication [that] raise[ed] serious constitutional problems." 42
When distinguishing between those boycotts that are protected and
those that aren't, the court noted that the present boycott was not
aimed at achieving economic gains, but at social and political ends,
namely ending racial discrimination. 43 The court stressed that
"political speech [lies] at the core of the First Amendment." 44
Political boycotts were also challenged under the Sherman
Antitrust Act. The Eighth Circuit addressed this issue in 1980. The
State of Missouri brought suit against the National Organization
for Women (NOW) for organizing a boycott in an attempt to pressure
states into ratifying the Equal Rights Amendment. 45 The boycott
called on supporters to avoid traveling to or engaging in business
with targeted states. 46 The Circuit Court held that because the
boycott was politically motivated, instead of commercially or
47
financially, it was "not within the scope of the Sherman Act."
Moreover, the court found that the "boycott... [was] privileged
[under] the First Amendment right to petition and the Supreme
Court[] recogni[zed] ... that important right [even] when it
48
collide[d] with commercial effects of trade restraints.
A few years later, the Supreme Court ruled on its first political
boycott case under a First Amendment theory when it decided
NAACP v. ClaiborneHardwareCo. 49 There, black residents of Port
Gibson, Mississippi decided to boycott white merchants as a way to
pressure local politicians into complying with demands for racial
equality and desegregation.
In response, the targeted white
merchants brought suit to recover for losses caused by the boycott
and to seek an injunction to prevent future boycotts. 50 The boycott

42 Id. at 303.

43 See id. ("There is no suggestion that the ...defendants were in competition with the
white businesses or that the boycott arose from parochial economic interests.").
44 Id.

45 Missouri v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1302 (8th Cir. 1980) ("[ ]NOW[ ]
organized a convention boycott against all states that had not ratified the proposed Equal
Rights Amendment....").
46 See Lee, supra note 2, at 545 ("NOW launched a boycott of the states that had not yet
ratified the ERA, calling on supporter to refuse to travel to these states and to conduct no
business with companies located within them.").
47 Nat'l Org. for Women, 620 F.2d at 1302.
48 Id.

at 1319.

49 See generally 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (upholding a boycott of white merchants as
constitutionally protected speech).
50 See id. at 889 (describing the facts that led to the lawsuit).
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lasted seven years, from 1966 until the start of litigation in 1972.51
As part of the boycott, "store watchers" waited outside of boycotted
establishments and identified black individuals who bought goods
from those stores; those individuals' names were noted and called
out at public meetings. 52 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the First
Amendment protections that political boycotts are entitled to.
Specifically in the context of a boycott affecting economic activity,
the Court held that as long as the boycott in question is aimed at
achieving political ends, it would not be a violation of the Sherman
Act. 53 The Court stressed that even if a boycott affects a business's
economic wellbeing, it is still protected. 54 The Supreme Court
further held that boycotts "to bring about political, social, and
economic change[] [t]hrough speech, assembly, and petition"
deserve heightened constitutional protections. 55 And, once speech
is protected, it shall be untouchable even if it does "not meet
56
standards of acceptability."
Political boycotts have been instrumental in bringing about
monumental changes in the United States. Their recognition by the
Supreme Court as constitutionally protected shows that "the
57
political boycott lies at the heart of the First Amendment."
III. ANALYSIS
This section will first show that boycotts of Israel, or BDS, are
protected speech under the First Amendment. It will then examine
why Georgia's anti-boycott legislation is unconstitutional. Lastly,
this section will present and disprove the counterargument that
Georgia's statute falls under the protections of government speech.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 903-04 (describing that store watchers "identified those who traded with the
[boycotted] merchants," whose names were later called out at public meetings).
53 See id. at 894 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So. 2d 1290, 1301 (Miss.
1980) ("[B] oycotts to achieve political ends are not a violation of the Sherman Act .....
54 See id. at 909 (finding that "peaceful picketing was entitled to constitutional protection,
even though... the purpose of the picketing 'was ...to advise customers and prospective
customers of the relationship existing between the employer and its employees and thereby
to induce such customers not to patronize the employer'" (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 99 (1940))).
55 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911-12 (1982).
56 Id. at 911 (citing Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
57 Lee, supra note 2, at 547 (noting that "[t]he three main theories underlying the First
Amendment are (1) the marketplace of ideas, (2)democracy and self-governance, and (3)selfexpression and autonomy").
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A. BOYCOTTS OF ISRAEL ARE PROTECTED SPEECH

BDS is similar to those political boycotts that have been
protected under the First Amendment in three import respects.
First, like the boycotts in Claiborneand Henry, BDS aims to achieve
political ends, and is not economically motivated. The stated aims
of BDS are to pressure Israel into dismantling the Israeli West
Bank barrier and withdrawing troops from the West Bank territory;
into "recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian
citizens of Israel to full equality"; and into complying with United
Nations Resolution 194.58 These goals are analogous to the ones
that the Supreme Court accepted as political, and thus protected by
the First Amendment in Claiborne. Second, like the boycotts in
Claiborne, BDS calls for a nonviolent protest, by withdrawing
financial support from targeted businesses and institutions. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that nonviolent political
boycotts cannot be silenced, even in light of the state's interest in
regulating economic activity. 59 Such political boycotts have been
protected time after time despite their detrimental economic effects.
Third, the method of speech used to further the aims of BDS are
similar to the ones that the Court found to deserve special
protection. Namely, the Court noted that, where speech itself is
used to further the aims of a boycott, this constitutes speech in its
most direct form. 60 Like the boycott in Claiborne, BDS launches
various campaigns as an effort to encourage and pressure others to
61
join.
The argument that BDS is a discriminatory political boycott, and
should therefore not be protected, is misplaced. Although severing
business dealings with a country may have discriminatory motives,
it does not necessarily. A boycott targeting foreign policies of
another nation, with a goal of changing those policies, does not

58 See What Is BDS?, BDS: FREEDOM JUSTICE EQUALITY, https://bdsmovement.net/whatis-bds (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).
59 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 459 U.S. 898, 914-15 (1982) (holding that "[tihe
right of the States to regulate economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition
against a nonviolent, politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and
economic change").
60 Id. at 909 (noting that where "nonparticipants... were urged to join the [boycott]" this
constituted "speech in its most direct form").
61 See, e.g., Academic Boycott, BDS: FREEDOM, JUSTICE, EQUALITY, https:/fbdsmovement.
net/academic-boycott (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).
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violate discrimination laws. 6 2 As stated in its objectives, BDS aims
to archive social and political change in Israel. It is not a boycott
generally aimed at Jewish-owned establishments. Further, even if
the Supreme Court were to find that Georgia's law is aimed at
combating discriminatory boycotts, the statute would still not pass
strict or even intermediate scrutiny. The statute in no way
addresses discriminatory boycotts; instead, it generally prohibits
the state from contracting with any party that is boycotting Israel,
63
not with those who are engaging in discriminatory conduct.
Arguments that the State is entitled to regulate activity that may
have security implications are also misguided. In this instance,
Georgia is prohibiting individuals from not engaging in relations
with another country. Laws that regulate national security, on the
other hand, typically prohibit individuals from engaging in relations
with foreign nations. 64 It would be difficult to imagine a scenario
where the state may compel a party to engage with another fornational security reasons.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that protections afforded
by the First Amendment "do[ ] not turn upon 'the truth, popularity,
or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.' "65 Some
may "support the use of economic pressure" to oppose Israel's
66
policies, while many others may find such boycotts unacceptable.
However, First Amendment protections do not turn upon the merit
of either one of those positions. Debates over public issues and
policies are exactly what the Founding Fathers created free speech

62 See id. (noting that laws prohibiting discriminatory boycotts are "limited to boycott
activity targeting... persons based upon race, creed, color, national origin, and other
protected statutes," and that [a] boycott directed at policies by a foreign national government
is simply not covered by... anti-discrimination laws").
63 See O.C.G.A. § 50-5-85 (2017) ("The state shall not enter into a contract with [a
party] ... unless the contract includes a written certification that [the party] is not currently
engaged in, and agrees for the duration of the contract not to engage in, a boycott of Israel.").
64 See, e.g., Congress Passes New Iran Sanctions, Ignoring Obama Admin Threats, THE
WASHINGTON FREE BEACON (Dec. 1, 2016), http://freebeacon.com/national-security/congresspasses-new-iran-sanctions-ignoring-obama-admin-threats/ (noting that sanctions against
Iran prohibiting trade are important for the safety and security of the United States).
65 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (quoting NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)).
66 LegislativeMemo: In Opposition of ProhibitingPoliticallyMotivated Boycotts, N.Y. CIVIL
LIBERTIES (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.nyclu.org/content/opposition-of-prohibiting-polit icallymotivated-boycotts#r4 (criticizing an act that would amend New York law to prohibit the
State from contracting with those who boycott Israel).
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protections for. Any government action attempting to silence such
67
speech should be scrutinized to the highest degree.
BDS and other boycotts of Israeli policies are like the ones that
the Supreme Court found to be constitutionally protected. They are
nonviolent, political movements that encourage citizens to
withdraw economic support from certain businesses as a means of
achieving social and political ends.
B. GEORGIA'S ANTI-BOYCOTT STATUTE VIOLATES FREEDOM OF
SPEECH

First Amendment by
Georgia's
statute violates the
unconstitutionally conditioning government benefits on a party
relinquishing his or her constitutional right. The Supreme Court
has held that the government "may not deny a benefit to a person
on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interest[] ... in freedom of speech." 6

The Court has repeatedly

upheld this principle, even when the aggrieved party does not have
an unqualified right to the denied benefit.69
In a recent Supreme Court decision, the Court struck down as
unconstitutional a requirement that nonprofit organizations
70
denounce prostitution in order to receive government funding.
The Court held that "the Government 'may not deny a benefit to a
person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected ...

benefit.'

"71

freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that

The Court drew a distinction between conditions that

67 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (pointing out that "speech on public
issues occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,' and is entitled
to special protection" (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982))).
68 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
69 Id. (finding that the government may not deny a person a governmental benefit, even if
he or she has no right to that benefit, if denying the benefit "infringes his [or her]
constitutionally protected interests-especially, his [or her] interests in freedom of speech");
see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 (1976) (holding that "if the government could deny
a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech . . . his exercise of those
freedoms would.., be penalized and inhibited"; Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968) (holding unconstitutional the termination of a teacher who spoke out against the school
board, by balancing the need to protect political speech against the need for efficiency of public
services).
70 See Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2323 (2013)
(holding that "[t]he Policy Requirement violates the First Amendment by compelling as a
condition of federal funding the affirmation of a belief that by its nature cannot be confined
within the scope of the Government program").
71 Id. at 2328 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).
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delineate limits of a government program and those that "leverage
funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program
itself."72 In other words, the state may direct how a party to a
government contract may use that contract, but it may not use the
contract as a means of controlling conduct outside the scope of the
contractual relationship.7 3 Boycotting Israel has no bearing on the
execution of a government contract, and thus, the statute's aims fall
outside of permissible conditions.
Georgia's statute attempts to control political speech by
extending the benefits of government contracts to only those who
subscribe to what Georgia's legislature has deemed as orthodox
politics. Georgia's statute is exactly the type that the Supreme
Court has deemed unacceptable: "If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
"..."74
or other matters of opinion .
C. GEORGIA'S ANTI-BOYCOTT STATUTES IS NOT PERMISSIBLE
GOVERNMENT SPEECH

Even if Georgia's statute impermissibly intrudes on protested
political speech, proponents of it may argue that the legislation falls
outside of First Amendment scrutiny, because it is permissible
government speech. Under the doctrine of government speech, the
government "is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from
determining the content of what it says." 75 However, other
"[c]onstitutional and statutory provisions outside the Free Speech
Clause may [still] limit government speech." 76 Here, conditioning
contracts on the relinquishment of constitutional rights is not a
form of permissible government speech.
The Supreme Court looks to three factors when determining
whether speech should be viewed as a form of government speech:
Id.
Compare Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544
(1983) (noting that limiting a government grant to non-lobbying purposes was constitutional,
because the condition did not prohibit that organization from lobbying altogether), with FCC
v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 399 (1984) (holding that a condition
that outright prohibited the beneficiary from all editorializing was unconstitutional).
74 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
75 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015)
(citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-68 (2009)).
76 Id. at 2246.
72

73
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(1) whether the expression has been historically used to convey
government speech; (2) whether the public typically identifies the
expression with the state; and (3) whether the government
maintains direct control over the messages conveyed through the
pertinent conduct or expression. Moreover, even if the government
is found to be speaking for itself, it may still not discriminate based
77
on viewpoint, if it is also regulating the speech of others.
The aforementioned factors were first presented in Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, where a religious organization's request for
a monument in a city park raised a First Amendment issue. 78 The
Court held that the city's refusal to erect the monument was a form
of government speech and was therefore not subject to free speech
scrutiny. 79
First, the Court reasoned that historically,
"[g]overnments have long used monuments to speak to the public."8 0
The Court acknowledged that governments erect statues to convey
a message to those who see it.81 Second, the Court noted that the
public associates monuments with "a city's opinion, primarily
because property owners do not typically open up their property for
the installation of permanent monuments that convey a message
with which they do not wish to be associated."8 2 Observers of
monuments are able to view the message conveyed by the structure
and easily associate it with the speaker.8 3 And third, the Court
found that historically governments have been allowed to
selectively choose what monuments to erect and what messages to
84
convey through them.
77 See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (holding
that "government regulation may not favor one speaker over another" if it affects private
speech).
78 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009).
79 Id.

80 Id. at 470.
81 See id. ("When a government entity arranges for the construction of a monument, it does
so because it wishes to convey some thought or instill some feeling in those who see the
structure.").
s2 Id. at 471.
s3 Id. ("because property owners typically do not permit the construction of [permanent
monuments that convey a message] on their land, persons who observe donated
monuments... reasonably[ ]interpret them as conveying some message on the property
owner's behalf' and "there is little chance that servers will fail to appreciate the identity of
the speaker").
84 See id. at 471-72 (noting that government entities have exercised selectivity when
accepting monuments, and have considered content-based factors like "esthetics, history, and
local culture" and explaining that those "monuments that are accepted... are meant to
convey.., a government message, and they thus constitute government speech").
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The Supreme Court applied the same factors in its analysis of the
most recent government speech case in Walker v. Texas Division,
Sons of Confederate Veterans.85 The Court found that Texas's
restriction on content of state license plates was permitted
government speech.8 6 First, the Court found that Texas has
historically conveyed messages through its license plate designs,
second "license plate designs 'are often closely identified ... with
the [State]," and third, Texas maintained "sole control" over the
8 7
messages conveyed on the plates.
Applying these factors to Georgia's statute leads to the
conclusion that Georgia's government contracts are not protected
government speech. First, the state has not historically used
contracts to convey a government message. Second, the public has
never been shown to associate government contracts with any
particular message or speaker. Contracts are usually confidential
dealings between parties, and even if they are not confidential,
contracts have not historically been associated with conveying a
political message. Instead, government contracts have been used as
8
commercial means to achieve commercial or civic ends.
Additionally, the state does not have sole and exclusive control over
the content of its contracts. Although the state does have a say in
the contractual terms, the other party may also negotiate its
contents. Lastly, Georgia's statute is not solely a method through
which the state seeks to speak. The statute goes too far by
attempting to control the private speech of others. Therefore, even
if government contracts are found to be a permissible form of
government speech, Georgia's statute would still be found
unconstitutional.
IV. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment protects a foundational right of a
democracy-the right to assemble and speak freely. The right to a
135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
See id. at 2253 ("Texas's specialty license plate designs constitute government speech,
and [thus] Texas was ... entitled to refuse to issue plates featuring SCV's proposed design.").
87Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248-49
(2015).
88 See Richard L. Barnes, Delusion by Analysis: The SurrogateMother Problem, 34 S.D. L.
REV. 1,11 (1989) ("Traditional contract law was developed in commercial contexts by drawing
on commercial values.").
85
86
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free debate would be meaningless if the government had the power
Georgia's statute
to punish those on the disfavored side.
conditioning government contracts on a party's agreement to
comply with the state's political views does just that, and it will have
a chilling effect on speech. If a proper plaintiff with standing
challenges the statute,8 9 the Supreme Court will likely strike
Georgia's statute as unconstitutional.

89 Finding a plaintiff with standing could be a challenge because Georgia's law has limited
practical impact, as BDS is not a major movement in the United States. Nonetheless, this
very point reiterates the fact that Georgia's law has the disquieting motive of sending a
message that undermines everything the First Amendment seeks to protect: it warns the
community to not challenge the state's political views.
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